What makes fiscal equalization politically acceptable?

A comparative study of Germany and Switzerland reveals the importance of perceived fairness

Fiscal equalization is one of the central mechanisms through which federal and decentralized countries seek to reconcile regional autonomy with national solidarity. By redistributing fiscal resources across jurisdictions, equalization systems help ensure that residents of poorer regions can access public services comparable to those available in wealthier regions, despite differences in their economic and tax bases.

Yet fiscal equalization is also politically contentious. Wealthier regions may object to transferring resources to poorer jurisdictions, while recipient regions often regard these transfers as essential to maintaining equitable public services. This raises an important question: What determines whether citizens support fiscal redistribution between regions?

A new (open access) study by Eva-Maria Trüdinger and Achim Hildebrandt, recently published in Regional & Federal Studies offers important insights into this question. Their article, (No) money for others? Perceived unfairness, support for welfare state intervention, and attitudes toward interregional redistribution, examines public attitudes toward fiscal equalization in Germany and Switzerland.

The authors find that citizens’ support for interregional redistribution cannot be explained simply by whether they live in a region that contributes to or benefits from fiscal equalization. Instead, perceptions of regional fairness and broader beliefs about the role of government play a decisive role.

Fiscal equalization in two federal systems

Germany and Switzerland provide particularly interesting cases for examining public attitudes toward interregional redistribution. Both countries have well-established federal systems and substantial fiscal equalization arrangements, but their approaches to federalism differ.

In Germany, fiscal equalization reflects a strong commitment to ensuring broadly equivalent living conditions across the country. Following reforms implemented in 2020, horizontal equalization between the German states operates primarily through the distribution of shared value-added tax revenues, supplemented by federal transfers. In 2023, approximately €18.3 billion was redistributed among the states through the equalization mechanism examined in the study.

Switzerland, by contrast, has a more decentralized federal tradition, with considerable cantonal autonomy over taxation and public spending. Fiscal equalization helps preserve this autonomy while compensating for differences in cantonal fiscal capacity. In 2023, seven donor cantons contributed approximately €1.8 billion in transfers benefiting 19 recipient cantons.

Despite these institutional differences, the underlying political challenge is similar: how can federal systems maintain public support for redistribution when some regions contribute substantially more than others?

Strong public support for interregional redistribution

Drawing on an online survey conducted in November and December 2023, the researchers analyzed responses from 3,693 individuals in Germany and 2,143 in Switzerland. Respondents were asked whether richer states or cantons should financially support poorer ones to ensure that everyone enjoys similar levels of public services. The results suggest that the principle of interregional solidarity enjoys substantial public legitimacy in both countries, notwithstanding recurring political disputes over the distribution of fiscal resources.

Indeed, the authors find that only a relatively small proportion of variation in public attitudes is attributable to the region in which respondents live: approximately 3 percent in Germany and 1 percent in Switzerland in their baseline models. Individual beliefs and orientations appear considerably more important than regional context alone.

Perceived unfairness changes the politics of redistribution

One of the study’s most important findings concerns the relationship between a region’s fiscal position and its residents’ perceptions of fairness.

Previous research has generally found that residents of wealthier donor regions are less supportive of fiscal equalization than residents of recipient regions. The new study confirms this general relationship but identifies an important qualification: Living in a donor region is associated with significantly lower support for interregional redistribution only among citizens who believe their region is treated unfairly by the federal government. Among respondents who do not perceive their region as unfairly treated, the difference in support between donor and recipient regions is not statistically significant.

This distinction is critically important. It suggests that opposition to fiscal equalization is not simply a mechanical consequence of contributing resources to other regions. Rather, the political acceptability of redistribution depends partly on whether citizens regard the broader intergovernmental relationship as fair.

In donor regions, perceptions of unfair treatment may reinforce the belief that their jurisdiction contributes disproportionately to the federation. Conversely, citizens who believe their region receives fair treatment may be more willing to accept transfers to less prosperous jurisdictions. The study also finds that the relationship becomes stronger as the magnitude of a region’s contributions increases. Among Swiss respondents in donor cantons, perceived unfairness is particularly relevant for lower-income individuals who struggle to make ends meet.

These findings suggest that the legitimacy of fiscal equalization depends not only on its distributional outcomes, but also on citizens’ perceptions of the fairness of the federal system.

Fiscal equalization and attitudes toward the welfare state

A second major finding concerns the connection between support for interregional redistribution and broader attitudes toward government intervention. The authors argue that fiscal equalization and welfare state redistribution share an underlying principle: public resources should be used to reduce inequalities and ensure that citizens enjoy acceptable standards of living and public services. The empirical results strongly support this argument.

Respondents who favor government intervention to reduce income differences and ensure decent living standards are considerably more likely to support interregional fiscal transfers. This relationship remains strong even after controlling for respondents’ general left–right political orientation and other characteristics. In fact, support for welfare state intervention is a substantially stronger predictor of attitudes toward interregional redistribution than conventional ideological self-placement.

This finding highlights an important connection between interpersonal and territorial redistribution. Although fiscal equalization formally transfers resources between governments rather than individuals, citizens may evaluate these arrangements through the same beliefs about solidarity, equity, and the responsibilities of government that shape their attitudes toward social welfare policies.

For supporters of a more interventionist welfare state, fiscal equalization can be understood as a necessary complement to decentralized governance: if subnational governments are responsible for delivering important public services, they must also have sufficient fiscal resources to fulfill those responsibilities.

What does this mean for fiscal decentralization?

The findings have several implications for the design and political sustainability of intergovernmental fiscal systems. First, they suggest that the political sustainability of fiscal equalization depends on more than the technical design of transfer formulas. While fiscal capacity, expenditure needs, and equalization objectives remain central to the design of effective transfer systems, public acceptance also depends on perceptions of fairness.

Second, the findings underscore the importance of transparency and public communication. If citizens in contributing regions believe their jurisdictions are being treated unfairly, support for redistribution may weaken even when the transfer arrangements are consistent with established equalization principles. Clear explanations of how fiscal equalization works, why transfers are needed, and how they contribute to national objectives may therefore be important for sustaining political legitimacy. This is a policy implication of the research rather than an intervention directly tested by the authors.

Third, the study suggests that fiscal equalization should be understood within the broader political economy of the welfare state. Support for redistribution between regions is closely connected to citizens’ expectations about the role of government in reducing inequalities and ensuring access to public services.

Finally, the results offer a reminder that regional political identities and economic interests do not necessarily determine attitudes toward federal redistribution. The authors find no clear independent relationship between regional identity and support for fiscal equalization in Germany and Switzerland, contrasting with some earlier findings from federations such as Canada and Spain.

These conclusions should be interpreted with some caution. The study is based on observational survey data and therefore identifies associations rather than causal relationships. Moreover, the survey measures support for the general principle that richer regions should help poorer regions provide comparable public services. It does not establish which particular equalization formulas, transfer amounts, or institutional arrangements citizens would prefer.

Beyond Germany and Switzerland

Although the research focuses on two established European federations, its findings raise broader questions for countries seeking to strengthen fiscal decentralization and address territorial inequalities.

In many countries, intergovernmental transfers are essential for enabling subnational governments to fulfill their expenditure responsibilities. Yet debates about fiscal equalization frequently focus on technical questions of revenue capacity, expenditure needs, and allocation formulas, with comparatively less attention to the political beliefs and public perceptions that shape support for redistribution. The study by Trüdinger and Hildebrandt suggests that these political dimensions deserve greater attention.

Whether these relationships hold in countries with less extensive welfare states, weaker intergovernmental institutions, or more pronounced territorial inequalities remains an important question for future research. Ultimately, the study offers a valuable contribution to our understanding of fiscal federalism: citizens’ willingness to share fiscal resources across regions depends not only on who pays and who benefits, but also on whether they believe the system is fair and whether they regard territorial solidarity as a legitimate responsibility of government.


Read the full article (open access):  Eva-Maria Trüdinger and Achim Hildebrandt (2026). “(No) money for others? Perceived unfairness, support for welfare state intervention, and attitudes toward interregional redistribution.” Regional & Federal Studies. Published online July 13, 2026.