Across the globe, democratic backsliding increasingly originates not from military coups or constitutional breakdowns, but from elected executives who concentrate power from within the system. Courts are packed, legislatures sidelined, and independent agencies weakened—often through formally legal means. In this context, scholars and practitioners alike are revisiting an old question with new urgency: can federalism meaningfully constrain authoritarianism?
A recent article in Publius: The Journal of Federalism offers a careful and timely answer. Rather than treating federalism as inherently democracy-enhancing, the article argues that federalism can function as a conditional constraint on authoritarian consolidation—one that depends critically on how autonomy, finance, and political authority are structured in practice.
Federalism as opportunity, not guarantee
Much of the classic federalism literature assumed a close alignment between federal arrangements, political pluralism, and democratic outcomes. Contemporary experience challenges this assumption. Authoritarian or illiberal leaders increasingly operate within federal systems, sometimes using federal institutions to entrench power rather than limit it.
The article’s central contribution is to reframe federalism not as a safeguard, but as an opportunity structure. Federalism does not prevent authoritarianism at the national level. What it can do—under specific institutional conditions—is preserve space for subnational democracy, complicate central domination, and slow authoritarian consolidation.
This distinction matters. The relevant question is no longer whether a country is formally federal or unitary, but whether subnational governments possess real, enforceable authority in a way that allows it to oppose the (potential) authoritarian tendencies of the center.
How federalism can constrain authoritarianism
The article identifies several mechanisms through which federalism may limit authoritarian reach when national executives seek to centralize power.
First, entrenched subnational autonomy matters. Where subnational powers are constitutionally protected, difficult to amend, and supported by independent administrative capacity, central authorities face higher political and legal costs in forcing compliance. Federalism constrains authoritarianism only when autonomy is juridical, not merely administrative.
Second, independent democratic mandates at the subnational level are crucial. Governors, mayors, and subnational legislatures that are directly elected and politically accountable to local constituencies can resist or reinterpret central directives. This is especially true when subnational governments control meaningful policy areas such as education, policing, health, or social services.
Third, federalism fragments authority. By dispersing fiscal, administrative, and sometimes coercive powers, federal systems increase the coordination and enforcement costs of authoritarian centralization. Even a powerful executive must bargain across multiple arenas rather than impose uniform control.
Fourth, subnational governments can preserve democratic norms over time. Even when resistance does not block authoritarian policies outright, subnational institutions can maintain opposition parties, protect civil society, and signal democratic backsliding to domestic and international audiences. Federalism can thus serve a temporal function, preserving democratic capacity for future political openings.
Importantly, the article emphasizes that these mechanisms operate unevenly. Federalism constrains authoritarianism not by stopping power grabs, but by complicating them.
When federalism fails
A key strength of the article is its refusal to romanticize federal systems. Federalism does not always constrain authoritarianism—and in some cases, it can actively facilitate it.
Federal arrangements are unlikely to provide meaningful resistance when subnational governments are fiscally dependent on the center, when courts are captured or centralized, or when the national government controls subnational elections and boundary rules. Informal or easily amended federal arrangements offer little protection when political power shifts.
In these contexts, federalism can become a transmission belt rather than a brake, allowing central authorities to implement authoritarian policies through subnational institutions. The article’s analysis underscores that the design of intergovernmental finance, electoral systems, and judicial review often matters more than constitutional labels.
Implications for contemporary federal systems
The article has important implications for how we think about federalism in countries experiencing democratic stress, including long-established federations.
First, it suggests that defending federalism is not primarily about symbolism or constitutional identity. It is about protecting real subnational responsibility—especially fiscal authority and service delivery functions that anchor political accountability.
Second, it reinforces the idea that “finance follows function” is not just a technocratic principle, but a democratic one. Subnational governments that depend overwhelmingly on conditional transfers or discretionary grants are poorly positioned to resist central pressure, regardless of their formal powers.
Third, the article critically highlights the importance of courts and legal enforceability. Federalism constrains authoritarianism only if subnational governments can credibly invoke legal protections and expect them to be upheld. If courts are unwilling to aggressively protect subnational governments from federal or higher-level government overreach, then the ability of federal systems to resist autocratic tendencies quickly crumbles.
Finally, the analysis suggests that federalism’s democratic value may be greatest not in moments of stability, but during periods of stress. Federal systems can preserve pluralism, maintain alternative centers of authority, and keep democratic practices alive below the national level—even when the center falters.
Conclusion: federalism as democratic insurance
The article ultimately advances a modest but powerful claim. Federalism is not a cure for authoritarianism, and it offers no guarantees. But under the right institutional conditions, it can function as a form of democratic insurance—preserving space, buying time, and sustaining alternatives.
For scholars and practitioners of decentralization and multilevel governance, this reframing is both sobering and constructive. The question is not whether federalism is good or bad for democracy in the abstract. The question is whether subnational governments have the authority, resources, and legitimacy to govern—and to do so independently when it matters most.
In an era when authoritarian pressures increasingly move from the top down, that question could not be more important.
Read the (open access) article: James A Gardner. 2026. Can Federalism Protect Subnational Liberal Democracy from Central Authoritarianism? Publius: The Journal of Federalism 56-1:22–48, https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjaf056
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