When the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) swept into power in 2002, it promised to loosen the rigid centralism that had long defined the Turkish state. In its first years, the party advanced decentralizing reforms that gave local governments more autonomy, established regional development agencies, and even initiated dialogue with the Kurdish minority. For a moment, Turkey appeared to be following a global trend in which decentralization was associated with democratization, efficiency, and cultural recognition.
Two decades later, however, that promise has been decisively reversed. Power is now concentrated in the presidency, local authorities operate under tight central tutelage, and Kurdish municipalities have been dismantled through state intervention. A recent article in Regional and Federal Studies argues that this reversal was not the product of institutional inertia or a simple return to tradition. Instead, it was the result of deliberate institutional redesign to meet the AKP’s shifting political, economic, and electoral needs.
The Early Reformist Agenda
The AKP’s first years in office were marked by an openness to decentralization rarely seen in modern Turkish politics. Local government laws passed between 2003 and 2005 expanded municipal powers, curtailed central oversight, and introduced principles of local autonomy. Regional development agencies were created to bridge state institutions and civil society, while early negotiations with Kurdish representatives suggested the possibility of asymmetrical governance.
These reforms were justified in three ways: politically, as a means of strengthening democracy; economically, as a way to promote bottom-up development; and socially, as a framework for recognizing minority rights. Taken together, they signaled a break with the Kemalist legacy of centralized control.
From Reform to Reversal
The trajectory shifted quickly. Central elites resisted aspects of decentralization, while Erdoğan’s leadership began to prioritize other goals. Importantly, decentralization was not openly dismantled. Instead, the AKP hollowed it out through mechanisms of institutional change.
One was institutional layering, whereby central authorities created or empowered new institutions that gradually overshadowed local powers. The transformation of TOKİ, the Housing Development Administration, is one example of this pattern. Once a modest housing agency, it became a dominant force in urban redevelopment, able to expropriate land and override municipal planning.
A second mechanism was the spread of informal rule, which subordinated local actors to central preferences without formally changing the law. Regional development agencies, intended to foster local participation, operated under the authority of governors and ministry officials. Municipalities learned to anticipate Ankara’s will, knowing that funding and approvals depended on compliance.
Finally, in the case of the Kurdish question, the government turned to institutional displacement. Beginning in 2015, elected Kurdish mayors were dismissed and replaced by government-appointed trustees, justified by the framing of Kurdish demands as national security threats. While formally temporary, these displacements became an enduring reality, eliminating local self-rule in the southeast.
The Strategic Logic of Recentralization
The review highlights that recentralization was not simply a by-product of political turbulence. It was a strategic choice rooted in shifting priorities.
Economically, centralization allowed the government to pursue a construction-led growth model. By controlling urban redevelopment through TOKİ and the Ministry of Urbanization, Ankara directed resources toward politically connected firms and used megaprojects as symbols of national pride.
Politically, informal control over municipalities reinforced President Erdoğan’s personal authority, ensuring that local leaders aligned themselves with the presidency. Nationally, securitization of the Kurdish issue provided a platform for building alliances with nationalist forces, especially after 2015.
In this sense, recentralization was not only about governing more effectively. It was also about consolidating power, rewarding loyal networks, and reshaping political competition in favor of the ruling party.
Broader Implications
Turkey’s reversal illustrates how decentralization is neither linear nor irreversible. While scholars often point to a global rise in the empowerment of regional and local authorities, the Turkish case demonstrates how decentralization can be undone through incremental institutional redesign. The reforms of the early 2000s were not repealed; they were overshadowed, undermined, or suspended in practice.
This experience also resonates with broader patterns among populist governments who use decentralization as a road to power, only then to reverse themselves (think: Museveni’s Uganda). State interventionism, nationalist mobilization, and executive aggrandizement frequently combine with institutional recentralization. Turkey provides a particularly clear example of how these dynamics can transform the relationship between national and local authority.
Conclusion
The paradox of the AKP lies in the contrast between its origins and its legacy. A party that once promised to empower local governments has overseen one of the most dramatic recentralizations in modern Turkish history. The institutions of decentralization still exist on paper, yet their substance has been stripped away by new central agencies, informal dominance, and outright displacement.
This was not an unintended relapse into Turkey’s centralist past but a deliberate political strategy. By reshaping institutions to serve shifting priorities, the AKP has transformed the balance between local and national authority through the concentration of power in the presidency. The Turkish case serves as a reminder that decentralization is not a one-way path toward democratization. It can just as easily be reversed—quietly, strategically, and with profound consequences for governance and representation.
Read the entire (open access) article:
Baudner, J. (2025). From decentralization to recentralization – policy reversal and institutional change during the AKP government in Turkey. Regional & Federal Studies, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2025.2454415
